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Governments all over the world spend large sums of money to entice foreign direct investment
(FDI), usually oﬀering generous tax incentives. It is generally expected that foreign ﬁrms will
generate positive externalities on domestic ﬁrms, particularly in developing countries. For
example, Javorcik (2004) provides evidence consistent with the existence of positive inter-
industry spillovers from foreign ﬁrms in Lithuania. However, the evidence on the success of
tax incentives in attracting FDI is rather mixed (see Desai et al. 2004), which raises the
question of what factors in fact inﬂuence where foreign ﬁrms locate.
The theoretical literature on ﬁrm location emphasizes a tension between production costs
and access to large ﬁnal goods markets and input suppliers. Recent work by Krugman and
Venables (1995), and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) shows that while the market size
is an important consideration for ﬁrms, the larger the markets the higher the cost of immobile
factors. The relative strength of these factors in determining location depends critically on
trade costs. The view that both market size as well as access to intermediate inputs aﬀect
foreign investors’ decisions is supported by anecdotal evidence. For instance, a manager of
Salcomp, a Finish mobile company, justiﬁed the interest of the company in China by stating
that “Our markets are in China, our components are there and wages are much lower...”
(Financial Times, May 2004).
Building on the predictions of the theoretical literature on economic geography, this
study examines the relative importance of market access, supplier access, trade costs and
factor costs on the entry of foreign ﬁrms into China. While FDI determinants have been
2analyzed extensively (for example, see Caves 1982; and Markusen 1995), little attention
has been paid to the new economic geography aspects of the investment decision. Notable
exceptions are studies by Head and Mayer (2004) and Head and Ries (1996). The former
study focuses on market access and shows that there exists a positive correlation between
entry of Japanese ﬁrms into the European Union (EU) and market potential measures, which
aggregate demand from multiple EU regions adjusted by distance. The latter study takes
into account market and supplier access as determinants of foreign entry into China, but
does not incorporate any spatial aspects. That is, their proxies for the availability of inputs
are the total number of industrial enterprises and the total value of industrial output within
the province of foreign entry in China.1
Our analysis extends the literature in several dimensions. First, we consider the impor-
tance of both market and supplier access in determining foreign entry, taking into account
spatial aspects. We allow for the possibility that ﬁrms purchase inputs not only from within
their own province, but also from other provinces within China and from the rest of the
world. Second, our measures of market and supplier access take into account the varying
degrees of inter-industry linkages. For example, proximity to a steel plant is likely to be
more valuable to a car producer than a textile manufacturer. Third, by incorporating all
the key factors highlighted in the new economic geography literature, we are able to pro-
vide an assessment of the relative importance of production costs and market size eﬀects in
attracting new entry.
China is a particularly interesting country in which to analyze FDI ﬂows. It was among
1Head and Ries (1996) assume that ﬁrms buy all their inputs locally and they do not distinguish in their
analysis between various degrees of input availability in diﬀerent industries.
3the top FDI recipients in the world during the period under study, receiving US$165 billion
of direct investment ﬂows between 1998 and 2001 (World Investment Report 2002, Annex
Table B3). Rising inequality between Chinese provinces has been of growing concern to
the Chinese government which has introduced a number of policies aimed at mitigating
this development.2 With over 90 percent of foreign investment being directed to the coastal
regions, the inﬂux of FDI has widened regional disparities between coastal and central regions
within China. By providing an assessment of the importance of market access and supplier
access relative to production costs, this study provides some guidance on the kinds of policy
instruments that would be most successful in attracting FDI to disadvantaged regions.
In addition to an intrinsic interest in determinants of FDI ﬂows into China, our study
sheds some light on the economic impact of inter-provincial barriers to trade. There exists ev-
idence suggesting that in an eﬀort to protect industries from competition, local governments
in China are erecting barriers to entry of goods from other provinces. The presence of such
barriers was reported by Kumar (1994) and Young (2000) and is consistent with anecdotal
evidence. For instance, managers of Chinese ﬁrms conﬁrmed that they have indeed expe-
rienced some diﬃculties in accessing markets in other provinces. A manager of a medical
manufacturing plant reported that the shipments to other provinces are occasionally stopped
b yl o c a lr a i lo ﬃcials for 2 to 4 weeks for no apparent reason. The administrative units of
industry and commerce department were reportedly obstructing access to markets through
2Strong economic growth experienced by China during this time did not beneﬁt all provinces equally. For
instance, while in 1999 the GDP of coastal provinces increased by 7.2%, central and western provinces experi-
e n c e dag r o w t hr a t eo fo n l y3 . 8a n d4 . 7 % ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .I n the same year, coastal provinces accounted for 60%
of Chinese GDP and almost three-quarters of national output of manufactured goods. See Amiti and Wen
(2001) for a discussion on regional inequality in earlier years and the spatial distribution of manufacturing
industries in 1995.
4audits or local registration requirements.3 Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly mea-
sure such barriers. As it is illegal to impose trade restrictions, the measures adopted to
protect local industries from competition are usually more subtle than a direct border tax.
Thus the only way to assess the signiﬁcance of such barriers is indirectly, as is the case in
our study.4
Our analysis is based on a comprehensive data set provided by the China National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS) covering nearly all manufacturing industries, at a highly disaggregated
level (515 industries) in 29 Chinese provinces, during the period 1998-2001.5 Using the
information on the value of output by industry and province, the national input/output
table and inter-provincial distances we construct measures of market access and supplier
access. We also create industry-speciﬁcm e a s u r e so ft a r i ﬀ rates on imported inputs. We
then relate these measures to the change in the number of foreign ﬁr m si ne a c hp r o v i n c e
and industry. We also control for a variety of provincial characteristics. Proxies for trade
costs at the provincial level include transport infrastructure and openness to international
trade. Production costs are proxied by provincial wages and electricity prices. We consider
separately market access and supplier access within and outside the province of foreign
3Interviews with ﬁrms and government oﬃcials were conducted by Amiti in ﬁve diﬀerent provinces in
October 2001.
4A number of researchers have tried to estimate the size of these provincial trade barriers using indirect
measures (see Poncet 2003, Young 2000, Naughton 1999, Huang and Wei 2003, and Bai et al. 2004), but none
of them has considered the consequences of such barriers. None of the studies has ruled out the existence of
provincial border barriers and some have found evidence that such barriers have increased over time.
5Other studies on the determinants of FDI in China rely either on information on provincial FDI stocks
(Cheng and Kwan, 2000), or on the Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade which lists
entry of individual ﬁrms (Head and Ries 1996, Dean, Lovely and Wang, 2002). The latter data set is,
however, limited in coverage as it includes only about 10 percent of new foreign ﬁrms, focuses exclusively
on joint ventures and stopped being published in 1996. It is also unclear what criteria were used to select a
particular sub-sample of all foreign investors for publication.
5entry. A lower magnitude of the coeﬃcients pertaining to trade outside the province of entry
relative to trade within the province would suggest that the internal trade barriers may be
restricting access of foreign investors to suppliers and customers in other regions.
The results indicate that market access and supplier access are the most important factors
aﬀecting FDI inﬂows. Doubling either market access or supplier access is associated with a
40% increase in the entry of foreign ﬁrms. The presence of customers and suppliers in the
province of entry matters much more than market and supplier access to the rest of China,
which is consistent with the presence of inter-provincial barriers to trade. Further, our
analysis suggests that provinces which are more open to foreign trade attract more foreign
ﬁrms. Similarly, the availability of infrastructure is positively correlated with foreign entry.
Although production costs also play a signiﬁcant role in determining the location of foreign
investment, the magnitude of these eﬀects is around half that of the market and supplier
access eﬀects. A doubling of wages or electricity prices reduces entry of foreign ﬁrms by
17% and 22%, respectively. Thus, our results suggest that local governments may do well
by reducing inter-provincial barriers, and hence increasing the extent of market and supplier
access in surrounding provinces, in order to attract foreign investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the formal model.
Section 3 provides background information on China and details of the data sources. Section
4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
62. Theory
We derive our estimating equation from a new economic geography model, based on Krug-
man and Venables (1995) and Amiti (2005)6. Firms are assumed to compete in a monop-
olistically competitive environment, with each ﬁrm producing a diﬀerentiated variety. All
varieties of ﬁnal goods enter symmetrically into the consumer’s utility function and all va-
rieties of intermediate inputs enter symmetrically in the ﬁrm’s cost function. Proﬁts of a























The total cost function comprises a ﬁxed cost, F, a constant cost, bi, and factor prices, where
wp i st h ew a g ei np r o v i n c ep, rp is the price of capital in province p or any other factor of
production, and P u




















The transport cost, ti
lp, of shipping a good from province l to p is modelled as Samuelsonian
iceberg costs, with t ≥ 1. This means that a proportion of imported inputs, 1 − 1
t,m e l t si n
transit. Hence, to deliver one unit of any good from one province to another t units must
be shipped as only a fraction 1
t arrives. If t =1t h e r ei sf r e et r a d ea n di ft = ∞ there is no
trade.
The fob producer price is given by proﬁt maximization, which gives the usual marginal
revenue equals marginal cost condition, with prices proportional to marginal cost:
6Amiti (2005) extends Krugman and Venables (1995) from a one-factor model to a two-factor model, thus




















The mark-up over marginal cost, θ
i, depends on the elasticity of substitution σi.
Output of each ﬁrm in industry i in province p, xi
p, is sold to consumers and ﬁrms located
within province p, in other provinces within China, and to the rest of the world. Product

















































Downstream ﬁrms spend a proportion µ of their total revenue, nd
lpd
lxd
l, on goods produced
by industry i (the second term in equation 2.6). Demand from downstream ﬁrms is derived
using Shepard’s lemma on the price index (as shown in Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).
Summing across all locations within China and the rest of the world, we derive aggregate










































8Substituting in the product market clearing condition (2.7) and the proﬁt maximizing price






































It is assumed that free entry and exit of ﬁrms ensures zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Firms
enter when proﬁts are positive and exit when proﬁts are negative. Any exogenous changes
t o ,s a y ,t r a d ec o s t sw o u l da ﬀect proﬁts and hence the number of ﬁr m si ne a c hl o c a t i o n .W e













Note that proﬁts, inclusive of the ﬁxed cost π  = π+F,i fF is small then ln(π+F)   ln(π),
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where νI represents industry ﬁxed eﬀects such as the degree of market power, θi,a n dνt
represents time ﬁxed eﬀects. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences, denoted by ∆,t h e s eﬁxed eﬀects are
7Note that in Krugman and Venables (1995), the ﬁxed cost is also a function of the factor prices and the
intermediate input price index. To simplify the equation, we assume that foreign ﬁrms pay a ﬁxed cost with
resources from the parent company.
9eliminated, and our estimating equation becomes
∆n
i






















Thus in our empirical analysis we include average wages varying by province and time. The
theory predicts a negative coeﬃcient on wages, that is other things equal, ﬁrms prefer to
locate in provinces that oﬀe rl o w e rw a g e s . A si nt h em o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a tn e we n t r a n t s
are too small individually to inﬂuence the provincial wage, so they take it as given. We
also assume that the supply of workers in each province is given and workers are immobile
between provinces and mobile between industries within a province. Thus in eﬀect, we are
treating each province analogously to a country in the theoretical model. This assumption is
a reasonable approximation in China, given the hukou system.8 The other province speciﬁc
costs rp could include any other factors of production whose costs vary across provinces, for
example electricity prices. Transport costs are modelled as a function of distance. Transport
costs can also be aﬀected by the availability of infrastructure, such as the number of sea
berths, river berths and lengths of railroads, which we include separately.
Our key variables of interest are market and supply access variables. We hypothesize
that proﬁts are positively related to better access to intermediate inputs, which are reﬂected
in a lower intermediate input price index, Pu
p ,w h i c hw ew i l lp r o x yb yt h r e ed i ﬀerent supplier
access variables; and that ﬁrms are also concerned about good market access, reﬂe c t e di nt h e
last term, which we will proxy by various market access variables. We deﬁne these variables
8The hukou is a system of residence permits that regulates the movement of labor.
10in the next section.
3. Data and Measurement
3.1. NBS Data
The data used in the analysis have been collected by the China National Bureau of Statistics
( N B S )a tt h eﬁrm level and then aggregated up to 600 industries by province, based on the 4
digit Chinese Industrial Classiﬁcation. Before releasing this data to us, the NBS removed all
‘sensitive industries’ from the sample, and then we excluded agriculture, extractive industries
and services in order to focus on the manufacturing sector. The information available includes
the number of foreign ﬁrms, the value of output of foreign ﬁrms and the value of output of
domestic ﬁrms. All variables vary by province, sector and time. Our sample covers the
1998-2001 period. It was not possible to include earlier years in the sample as data on the
number of foreign ﬁrms were unavailable.
The ﬁgures indicate that a vast majority of foreign entry in 2001 occurred in coastal
provinces (see Appendix). Seven out of twelve provinces in the coastal region saw the number
of foreign investment projects rising by more than a hundred. Guangdong and Zhejiang were
the most successful provinces increasing the number of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs)
by about 600 each. Although midland provinces received much less net foreign investment,
some provinces like Hunan recorded a net entry as high as 40, similar to some of the coastal
provinces such as Beijing.
In terms of distribution of net entry across industries, both sectors producing consumer
goods and industrial parts and components appeared to be attractive to foreign investors.
11The more attractive consumer industries included paper products, household plastic prod-
ucts, lamps and lanterns, and cotton knitting, while in the industrial categories there was
a lot of foreign activity in electronic elements and automobile ﬁttings and parts. In 2000
and 2001, manufacturing of clothing (classiﬁcation 1810) experienced the largest rise in the
number of foreign projects, from 160 to 260. See Table 1A for details.
Foreign investment enterprises account for a signiﬁcant share of industrial output pro-
duced in China. In 2001 their share in total production was equal to 31.3 percent. The share
of FIEs in provincial output ranged from 2.4 percent in Xinjiang to 58 percent in Tianjin,
65 in Fujian and 61 in Guangdong in 2001. In twenty sectors (out of 515 considered in
our sample), foreign enterprises accounted for three-quarters or more of industrial output
produced in China in 2001. These included some technology intensive industries, such as
manufacturing of copying machines, computers, cameras and instruments, communication
equipment, radio and tape recorders, integrated circuits as well as consumer good industries
— processing of ﬁsh sauce and production of soft drinks.
3.2. Entry and Exit of Foreign Firms
The dependent variable in our model is deﬁned as the change in the number of foreign ﬁrms




p,t−1. The variable is positive if the number of ﬁrms that entered is greater
than the number of ﬁrms that exited; zero if there has been no change or the number of new
ﬁrms exactly equals the number of exiting ﬁrms; and negative if the number of exiting ﬁrms
exceeded the number of new entrants.9
920% of the observations are non-zero.
123.3. Supplier Access
We construct three measures of supplier access. The ﬁrst one is SA_owni
p,t which captures















p,t is the output of industry k produced in province p at time t. It is divided by the
total output of industry k produced in China, to get the share of output of each industry
k produced in each province. Since industries use more than one intermediate input, these
output shares are weighted by aik, which are the coeﬃcients from the China national input-
output (I/O) table for 1997. Given that this is the most recent I/O table available, we
assumed that the technology is constant throughout the sample period. There is variation
in the supplier access variables due to entry and exit of ﬁrms. There are 70 manufacturing
I/O codes, which we concord with the industrial data. Thus, while we analyze entry for 515
industries, our proxies for supplier access are deﬁned for 70 I/O codes. In order to make this
variable comparable with the proxy for input availability in other provinces (SA_outeri
p,t)




















which is analogous to the own province supplier access measure. To take account of the
additional cost of accessing inputs from other provinces, we weight the output shares pro-
duced in each province by the inverse of distance from province p to province l. While this
13measure is intended to capture the cost of transporting intermediate inputs it may also, to
some extent, reﬂect local protectionism.
The importance of intermediate supplies from the rest of the world is proxied by trade
weighted tariﬀs imposed by China on imported intermediate inputs, weighted by the I/O









The information on trade weighted tariﬀs on products corresponding to the I/O codes comes
from the World Bank’s WITS database. It should be noted that many industries in China
have access to duty free intermediate inputs through duty drawbacks and hence would not
be aﬀected by tariﬀs on intermediate inputs. Nonetheless, there are many industries that do
pay these tariﬀs and thus it is important to include this variable in the estimation.10
3.4. Market Access
We construct two measures of market access to reﬂect that ﬁrms can supply other ﬁrms
and households within their own province and in other provinces. The own market access




















p,t is the output of industry k produced in province p at time t. It is divided by
the total output of industry k produced in China, to get the share of industry k’s output
produced in each province. The share is then weighted by bik, which is the fraction of
10Approximately 40 per cent of imports are subject to tariﬀs.
14industry i’s output sold to industry k as intermediate input, and bi is the fraction sold for
ﬁnal consumption to households. Note that
K [
k=1
bik + bi =1 . The coeﬃcients bik and bi have
been calculated based on the China national I/O table for 1997.























where each province’s consumption of industry’s i’s output is weighted by the inverse of
distance.
3.5. Provincial characteristics
In addition to distance as a proxy for trade costs, we include in the estimation the number
of river and sea berths and length of railroads, using information from the China Annual
Statistical Yearbooks. The degree of openness of a province is constructed from international
trade data from the Chinese Customs Oﬃce. The production cost variables at the provincial
level include data on electricity prices and wages obtained from the NBS. Wages are calcu-
lated as the ratio of the total wage bill to employment by province and year. We include
all locations in China except Tibet and Inner Mongolia because the latter two have very
little industrial activity. This gives us 29 locations comprising 25 provinces and 4 directly
administered cities: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing. Table 1 provides summary
statistics of all the variables.
153.6. Model Speciﬁcation
Substituting in the proxies for supplier and market access, our estimating equation (2.11)
c a nb er e w r i t t e na s
∆n
i,

















p,t + ∆lnXp,tβ + ε
i
p,t.
We estimate equation (3.6) using ordinary least squares (ols), omitting the outer terms, and
with non-linear least squares (nls), adjusting standard errors for clustering on I/O-code-year
combinations. Since market access and supplier access variables tend to be highly correlated,
in addition to the full speciﬁcation presented above we also estimate models with only market
access or supplier access variables.
4. Results
The results, presented in Table 2, conﬁrm the importance of proximity to markets and
suppliers. We present both ols and nls results in all the Tables to illustrate the importance
of links to other provinces.11 Comparing the ols results in columns (1) to (3) to the nls
results in columns (4) to (6), we see that the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients on market access
and supplier access variables are much higher in the nls estimations, where we take account
11This also serves as an additional robustness test - the fact that coeﬃcients on all the other variables
are similiar in both speciﬁcations adds conﬁdence that the non-linear estimations are in fact global minima
rather than local ones.
16of access to other provinces. Comparing columns (1) and (4), where both market access
and supplier access are included, the coeﬃcient on MA increases from 0.16 to 1.14,a n dt h e
coeﬃcient on SA increases from 0.26 to 1.09, which suggests that access to other provinces
is important for entry. Note that even though some of the access variables are individually
insigniﬁcant in column (4), F-tests indicate they are jointly signiﬁcant with a p−value equal
to 0. In columns (5) and (6), we re-estimate the equation with only SA in column (5)
and only MA in column (6). Here we see that the coeﬃcients on SA and MA are even
larger than when they are included jointly, which is likely due to the correlation between the
terms. Using estimates from column (4) with the full speciﬁcation, the results indicate that
a doubling of either market access or supplier access increases the entry of foreign ﬁrms by
0.8, and evaluated at the mean number of foreign ﬁrms (equal to 1.87), this is equivalent to
a 40% increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms in an industry/province.
Interestingly, both the outer terms on market access and supplier access are positive and
less then one. Since both own and outer supplier access have been adjusted for distance,
the parameter βSA_outer allows us to compare the relative magnitude of the two eﬀects. A
coeﬃcient below one would suggest that the presence of suppliers in other provinces is less
important that the ability to source within the own province. This indeed is the case as
βSA_outer equals 0.14 in column (4); and the coeﬃcient on βMA_outer is 0.42, which implies
that outer supplier access is approximately 14% of the total supplier access eﬀect, and the
outer market access eﬀect is approximately 40 percent of the total market access eﬀect. This
ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms may face some diﬃculties with accessing inputs and selling their
products in neighboring provinces either due to high transport costs and/or interprovincial
17barriers to trade.
Since foreign investors may also import some of their inputs, the model controls for the
average tariﬀ charged on inputs used by industry i and the province’s openness to trade
(deﬁned as the share of provincial imports and exports to GDP). As hypothesized, the
average tariﬀ bears a negative sign, while openness to trade is positively correlated with
foreign entry. Both variables are signiﬁcant in all six speciﬁcations, which suggests that ease
of access to imported intermediates is important to foreign investors.
Production costs are also crucial in determining where foreign ﬁrms locate. As antici-
pated, the coeﬃcient on the average provincial wage is negative and signiﬁcant suggesting
that foreign investors are attracted to locations with lower labor costs. Further, provinces
with cheaper electricity appear to be more attractive as an investment destination. In all
speciﬁcations in Table 2, the coeﬃcient on wage is equal to -0.6 and on electricity around
-0.45. Thus a doubling of production costs decreases foreign entry between 17% and 22%,
respectively. This is about half the size of the eﬀect of doubling either MA or SA.
The availability of infrastructure plays a role in the entry decision as well. The higher the
number of sea berths or the length of railroads the higher the foreign entry. The number of
river berths, on the other hand, appears to have a very small negative eﬀect. The length of
rail has the largest eﬀect out of the infrastructure variables, with a coeﬃcient equal to 0.85.
This implies that doubling rail increases foreign entry by 32%, suggesting that transport
costs are indeed a signiﬁcant factor in determining entry.
184.1. Sensitivity
Links to Domestic Firms To ensure that the output of the new entrants is not driving
the results, we reconstruct the MA and SA variables using only the output of domestic
ﬁrms. Ideally, we would only purge the variables of the output of those new foreign entrants,
however, since our data are at the industry level this information is not available. One
drawback of removing all foreign output in the access variables is that it may be omitting
important inter-industry linkages in industries that may be dominated by foreign ﬁrms. The
results are presented in Table 3. We see that the inclusion of these domestic oriented linkage
terms increases the size of the SA variables and reduces the size of the MA variables. The
coeﬃcients on all other variables are very similar to the earlier estimates. In this case, it
appears that the high correlation between MA and SA variables may be aﬀecting the MA
coeﬃcients when all of them are included, as the hypothesis that βMA_own = βMA_outer =0
cannot be rejected in column (4). Yet the F-test of the joint signiﬁcance of the MA terms
when they are included on their own as in column (6) indicates joint signiﬁcance with a
p-value equal to 0. The two SA coeﬃcients have a higher magnitude than before with
both terms being statistically signiﬁcant in column (5), which suggests that access to inputs
purchased from domestic ﬁrms is relatively more important than those purchased from other
foreign ﬁrms.
Domestic Oriented Foreign Firms The ability to sell products within China is likely
to matter less for export-oriented investors. Thus, to check the robustness of our earlier
ﬁndings we re-estimate the above models restricting the sample to industry-province-year
19combinations where less than 30 percent of output is exported (see Table 4). The export-
orientation of a given industry in a particular province is calculated by summing the value of
exports of all ﬁrms operating in a given industry, province and year combination and dividing
it by the sum of the total production in the same cell. If an observation for a particular
year is missing it is substituted with an observation for the closest year available.12 The
results conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings. The eﬀects of the MA and SA variables are of similar
magnitudes to the previous results. Although the coeﬃcients are a bit smaller than in the full
sample, they range between 0.6 and 0.7,a sc o m p a r e dt o1.1 in Table 2, they correspond to a
similar sized eﬀect when evaluated at the mean number of ﬁrms: doubling SA is associated
with a 51% increase in entry when evaluated at the mean number of foreign ﬁrms which is
equal to one in this sub-sample, and doubling MA is associated with a 44% increase.
The signs and signiﬁcance levels of other variables remain unchanged. To ensure that
our results are not driven by choosing the cutoﬀ at 30 percent, we also estimate the model
for industry-province-year combinations where the share of exported output is less than 50
percent. The conclusions with respect to our key variables remain unchanged.
4.2. Extensions
I nT a b l e5 ,w ee x p l o r et h ee ﬀect of additional controls for distance to port13 and the invest-
ment climate in the province, proxied by the total number of foreign ﬁrms in the province
lagged one period. The results suggest that provinces close to ports appear to be more at-
12This data series has been provided by Sourafel Girma. See Girma and Gong (2004) for detailed infor-
mation on the data source.
13This is measured as the shortest distance to one of the three major ports: Shanghai, Hong Kong and
Qinhuangdao (Hebei).
20tractive investment destinations, which is not surprising, since as we discussed earlier, coastal
regions have been the primary recipients of FDI in China. The negative coeﬃcient in this
ﬁrst diﬀerenced equation suggests that distance to ports has become more important over
time.
The ‘total foreign ﬁrms’ variable is deﬁned as the total number of foreign ﬁrms in all
industries in a province, rather than a particular industry as is the case with the depen-
dent variable, and it enters as a one period lag. The coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant.
Provinces with a large number of foreign ﬁrms are more attractive to new entrants either
due to agglomeration beneﬁts or due to a better investment climate that attracted the other
ﬁrms. It seems that the competition for resources or congestion externalities have not yet
outweighed the beneﬁts of being in a province with many other foreign ﬁrms present. Con-
trolling for distance to ports and the lagged number of foreign ﬁrms reduces the market
access eﬀects slightly but leaves the supplier access coeﬃcients unchanged.
5. Conclusion
This study examines factors driving entry of foreign ﬁrms in China, using a comprehensive
dataset covering nearly all manufacturing industries at the provincial level during the period
1998-2001. The analysis is based on a new economic geography model, and thus focuses on
the importance of market and supplier access eﬀects both within and outside the province
of entry, relative to production costs.
The ﬁndings suggest that access to customers and suppliers of intermediate inputs are
the key determinants of FDI inﬂows. The analysis also highlights the importance of taking
21into account linkages to neighboring regions. After allowing for such linkages, the eﬀects
of market and supplier access increase signiﬁcantly. The results show that doubling either
market access or supplier access is associated with a 40% increase in the entry of foreign ﬁrms,
whereas the eﬀect of doubling production costs reduces entry of foreign ﬁrms by roughly 20%.
The analysis also shows that the presence of customers and suppliers in the province of
entry matters much more than market and supplier access to the rest of China. This may
be due to the underdeveloped transport infrastructure and informal barriers to trade and is
consistent with the fragmentation of the Chinese market.
Other trade costs also appear to play an important role in attracting FDI. For instance,
the availability of infrastructure, such as rail lines, is positively correlated with foreign entry,
whereas high tariﬀs on imported inputs deter entry. Provinces which are more open to foreign
trade attract more foreign ﬁrms. In sum, barriers to trade whether in the form on tariﬀso n
imported inputs, informal barriers to inter-provincial trade or underdeveloped infrastructure
play a signiﬁcant role in the decisions of foreign investors contemplating entry into China.
If China’s central government is serious about redressing regional inequality, it must ad-
dress the issue of local protection and high internal trade costs. Dismantling inter-provincial
barriers, and improving transport infrastructure will increase market and supplier access for
both Chinese and foreign producers, attracting entry of new ﬁrms.
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Table 1A. Industries with the Highest Net Entry of Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIEs) 
          
Rank  Year  Industry code  Industry description   Net entry
1  2001 1810  Manufacture of clothing  260
2  2000 1810  Manufacture of clothing  160
3  2001 4160  Manufacture of electronic elements  131
4  2000 4160  Manufacture of electronic elements  83
5  2001 2230  Manufacture of paper products  79
6  2001 3070  Manufacture of household plastic products  70
7  2000 3727  Manufacture of automobile fittings and parts  69
8  2001 3727  Manufacture of automobile fittings and parts  64
9  2001 4073  Manufacture of lamp and lanterns  59
10  2001 1781  Manufacture of cotton knitting  58
11  1999 3090  Manufacture of other plastic products  51
12  2001 1390  Processing of other food  48
13  2001 1790  Other textile industry  48
14  2001 3434  Manufacture of abrasive tools  48
15  2001 2312  Printing of packing , decorating  47
 
   28
Table 1: Summary statistics (1999 to 2001)      
Variable  no. of obs  mean std dev min max 
(n)ipt 44,805  1.87 12.01 0 922 
∆(n)ipt  44,805 0.11 1.57 -116 101 
(MA_own)ipt  44,805 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0057 
∆ln(MA_own)ipt  44,805 -0.0133 0.1125 -2.7159 1.6639 
(MA_own_domestic)ipt  44,805 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0062 
∆ln(MA_own_domestic)ipt  44,805 -0.0122 0.1239 -2.8279 1.5531 
(MA_outer)ipt 44,805  0.0011 0.0005 0.0001 0.0036 
(SA_own)ipt 44,805  0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0031 
∆ln(SA_own)ipt  44,805 -0.0182 0.1201 -1.5659 1.5223 
(SA_own_domestic)ipt 44,805  0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 0.0029 
∆ln(SA_own_domestic)ipt  44,805 -0.0170 0.1371 -1.7373 1.6424 
(SA_outer)ipt 44,805  0.0011 0.0005 0.0001 0.0043 
ln(SA_abroad)pt 44,805  16.62 7.62 7.18 54.32 
∆ln(SA_abroad)pt   44,805 -0.01 0.07 -0.33 0.92 
(wage)pt  44,805 8.76 2.53 5.29 17.72 
∆ln(wage)pt  44,805 0.12 0.10 -0.06 0.85 
(elect_price)pt 44,805  0.43 0.08 0.34 0.65 
∆ln(elect_price)pt  44,805 0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.14 
(population)pt (millions)  44,805  41.80 25.30 4.82 92.60 
∆ln(population)pt   44,805 0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.21 
(openness)pt   44,805  0.25 0.31 0.04 1.50 
∆ln(openness)pt  44,805 0.04 0.20 -0.55 0.56 
(seaberths)pt 44,805  31.83 64.32 0 272 
∆(seaberths)pt  44,805 0.92 4.81 -10 31 
(riverberths)pt 44,805  27.36 72.22 0 387 
∆(riverberths)pt  44,805 -9.52 57.61 -337 170 
(rail)pt 44,805  1960.63 1178.25 219 5503.2 
∆ln(rail)pt  44,805 0.07 0.15 -0.20 1.02 
ln(Distance_port)pt 44,805  6.37 1.06 2.98 9.11 
ln(Total foreign firms)p,t-1 44,805  5.61 1.63 1.79 9.00 
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Table 2: Determinants of Foreign Entry 
Dependent Variable: ∆(n)ipt   
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ols  ols  ols nls nls nls 
∆ln(MA_own)ipt  0.159**   0.258***  1.144   1.774*** 
  (0.072)    (0.082) (0.865)   (0.752) 
(MA_outer)ipt
c      0.424    0.356 
      (0.477)    (0.249) 
∆ln(SA_own)ipt  0.269*** 0.321***   1.094** 1.463***   
  (0.054)  (0.054)   (0.553) (0.539)   
(SA_outer)ipt
c      0.142  0.168*   
      (0.113)  (0.095)   
∆ln(SA_abroad)pt  -0.353** -0.354** -0.360**  -0.364*** -0.364*** -0.364*** 
  (0.143)  (0.145)  (0.139) (0.140) (0.141) (0.139) 
∆ln (wage)pt  -0.595*** -0.596*** -0.603***  -0.602*** -0.603*** -0.605*** 
  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
∆ln(elect_price)pt  -0.473** -0.489***  -0.463** -0.419** -0.432*** -0.447*** 
  (0.185)  (0.184)  (0.187) (0.182) (0.182) (0.185) 
∆ln(population)pt  1.271*** 1.292*** 1.285***  1.376*** 1.376*** 1.349*** 
  (0.353)  (0.354)  (0.354) (0.355) (0.356) (0.356) 
∆ln(openness)pt  0.182*** 0.180*** 0.180***  0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
∆ln(seaberths)pt  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
∆ln(riverberths)pt  -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0002*  -0.0003** -0.0002**  -0.0002* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
∆ln(rail)pt  0.852*** 0.853*** 0.851***  0.848*** 0.852*** 0.846*** 
  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.178) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) 
H0: βMA_outer=0; βSA_outer=0      F=18.73 
p-value=0    
H0: βMA_own=0; βMA_outer=0      F = 5 . 5 3  
p-value=0   
H0: βSA_own=0; βSA_outer=0      F=15.42 
p-value=0    
RSS  108778.96  108791.50  108819.98 108688.05 108714.87 108762.89 
Observations  44805  44805  44805 44805 44805 44805 
Notes: a)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; b) Robust standard errors corrected for 
clustering in parentheses; c) MA_outer and SAouter terms enter non-linearly as in equation (3.6).   30
 
Table 3: Links to Domestic Firms 
Dependent Variable: ∆(n)ipt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
  ols ols ols nls  nls  nls 
∆ln(MA_own)ipt  0.072   0.139**  0.1071   0.7878 
 (0.046)    (0.055)  (0.771)    (0.513) 
(MA_outer)ipt
c      0.780    0.315 
      (7.364)    (0.304) 
∆ln(SA_own)ipt  0.167*** 0.191***    1.414 1.451**   
 (0.056)  (0.058)    (0.881)  (0.679)   
(SA_outer)ipt
c      0.4648  0.4672*   
      (0.341)  (0.273)   
∆ln(SA_abroad)pt  -0.358** -0.359** -0.361**  -0.367*** -0.367***  -0.365*** 
 (0.143)  (0.144)  (0.140)  (0.141)  (0.141)  (0.139) 
∆ln (wage)pt  -0.596*** -0.596*** -0.604*** -0.601*** -0.601***  -0.605*** 
 (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.097)  (0.097) 
∆ln(elect_price)pt  -0.476** -0.485***  -0.470** -0.430*** -0.431***  -0.456*** 
 (0.186)  (0.186)  (0.187)  (0.183)  (0.184)  (0.185) 
∆ln(population)pt  1.309*** 1.316*** 1.312*** 1.389*** 1.388***  1.353*** 
 (0.353)  (0.353)  (0.355)  (0.356)  (0.355)  (0.358) 
∆ln(openness)pt  0.179*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.180***  0.177*** 
 (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066) 
∆ln(seaberths)pt  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***  0.011*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
∆ln(riverberths)pt  -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002*  -0.0002* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
∆ln(rail)pt  0.858*** 0.857*** 0.856*** 0.858*** 0.858***  0.855*** 
 (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.177)  (0.177)  (0.178) 
H0: βMA_outer=0; βSA_outer=0      F=11.82 
p-value=0    




H0: βSA_own=0; βSA_outer=0      F=12.19 
p-value=0    
RSS  108823.92 108827.02 108844.30 108766.54  108766.76  108825.75 
Observations  44805 44805 44805 44805  44805  44805 
Notes: a)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; b) Robust standard errors corrected for 
clustering in parentheses; c) MA_outer and SAouter terms enter non-linearly as in equation (3.6). 
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Table 4: Domestic Market-oriented Foreign Firms 
Dependent Variable: ∆(n)ipt 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
  ols  ols ols  nls nls  nls 
∆ln(MA_own)ipt  0.069*   0.122***  0.640   0.950* 
 (0.035)    (0.040)  (0.585)    (0.521) 
(MA_outer)ipt
c       0.915    0.476 
       (1.116)    (0.388) 
∆ln(SA_own)ipt  0.149*** 0.171***    0.732* 0.940**   
 (0.032)  (0.031)    (0.412)  (0.413)   
(SA_outer)ipt
c       0.177  0.226   
       (0.144)  (0.140)   
∆ln(SA_abroad)pt  -0.117* -0.118*  -0.122**  -0.124** -0.124**  -0.125** 
  (0.061)  (0.062) (0.060)  (0.060) (0.060)  (0.060) 
∆ln (wage)pt  -0.202*** -0.202***  -0.206***  -0.207*** -0.207***  -0.208*** 
  (0.050)  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.050) 
∆ln(elect_price)pt  -0.228** -0.236**  -0.219**  -0.200** -0.204**  -0.213** 
  (0.094)  (0.094) (0.095)  (0.093) (0.093)  (0.095) 
∆ln(population)pt  0.436** 0.447**  0.446**  0.497*** 0.497***  0.481*** 
  (0.187)  (0.186) (0.187)  (0.188) (0.188)  (0.187) 
∆ln(openness)pt  0.077** 0.076**  0.075**  0.075** 0.074**  0.074** 
  (0.035)  (0.035) (0.035)  (0.035) (0.035)  (0.035) 
∆ln(seaberths)pt  0.006*** 0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 0.006***  0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
∆ln(riverberths)pt  -0.000 -0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
∆ln(rail)pt  0.272*** 0.272***  0.271***  0.268*** 0.270***  0.268*** 
  (0.090)  (0.090) (0.090)  (0.090) (0.090)  (0.090) 
H0: βMA_outer=0; βSA_outer=0       F=15.72 
p-value=0    
H0: βMA_own=0; βMA_outer=0       F=2.54 
p-value=0.08    
H0: βSA_own=0; βSA_outer=0       F=16.61 
p-value=0    
RSS 27648.26  27650.52  27659.90 27626.60  27630.11  27649.49 
Observations  40116  40116 40116  40116 40116  40116 
Notes: a)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; b) Robust standard errors corrected for 
clustering in parentheses; c) MA_outer and SAouter terms enter non-linearly as in equation (3.6).   32
 
Table 5: Determinants of Foreign Entry – Extensions 
Dependent Variable: ∆(n)ipt 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ols  ols  ols nls nls nls 
∆ln(MA_own)ipt  0.130*   0.200***  0.818   1.380** 
 (0.066)    (0.071)  (0.760)    (0.663) 
(MA_outer)ipt
c       0.290    0.273 
       (0.424)    (0.219) 
∆ln(SA_own)ipt  0.197*** 0.239***    1.019* 1.312***   
 (0.052)  (0.051)    (0.550)  (0.514)   
(SA_outer)ipt
c       0.144  0.159   
       (0.124)  (0.098)   
∆ln(SA_abroad)pt  -0.271** -0.272**  -0.275**  -0.279*** -0.277*** -0.279*** 
  (0.119)  (0.120)  (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.116) 
∆ln (wage)pt  -0.474*** -0.475***  -0.481***  -0.475*** -0.476*** -0.479*** 
  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) 
∆ln(elect_price)pt  -0.226 -0.238  -0.212  -0.178 -0.189 -0.197 
  (0.151)  (0.150)  (0.153) (0.149) (0.148) (0.152) 
∆ln(population)pt  0.505 0.518  0.498  0.591* 0.579*  0.555 
  (0.337)  (0.337)  (0.339) (0.341) (0.340) (0.341) 
∆ln(openness)pt  0.214*** 0.213***  0.214***  0.208*** 0.210*** 0.209*** 
  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
∆ln(seaberths)pt  0.006* 0.006*  0.006*  0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
∆ln(riverberths)pt  -0.000* -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.0002** -0.0002**  -0.0002* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ln(rail)pt  0.814*** 0.815***  0.812***  0.810*** 0.813*** 0.808*** 
  (0.176)  (0.175)  (0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) 
(Distance_port)pt  -0.042*** -0.042***  -0.040***  -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
(Total foreign   0.045***  0.046***  0.048*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
firms)p,t-1 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
H0: βMA_outer=0; βSA_outer=0       F=17.43 
p-value=0   
H0: βMA_own=0; βMA_outer=0       F=3.73 
p-value=0.02   
H0: βSA_own=0; βSA_outer=0       F=11.82 
p-value=0    
RSS  108306.81  108315.12  108328.53 108212.8 108232.9 108276.6 
Observations  44805  44805  44805 44805 44805 44805 
Notes: a)* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; b) Robust standard errors corrected for 
clustering in parentheses; c) MA_outer and SAouter terms enter non-linearly as in equation (3.6). 
 